In this paper, we examine the implications of endogenous technological change through learningby-doing when energy is supplied by both traditional resource firms and firms exploiting an emerging technology which is an experience good. The resource owners face competing incentives to extract rents from the resource and to prevent expansion of the new technology. We show that in such a context, it is not the case that higher energy prices will induce alternative energy supply as resources are exhausted. Rather, we show that as we increase the learning potential in the substitute technology, we lower equilibrium energy prices and may increase emissions. We examine how carbon taxes and subsidy policies for alternative energy are likely to affect behaviour in this context, and show that the effects of these policies are altered substantially by increased potential for technological change. We show that rather than harnessing the power of endogenous technological change to reduce emissions, carbon taxation may have less effect on emissions the greater is the potential for technological change. Hotelling may not have advocated killing the electric car, but we show that optimal resource extraction does not imply blindly rendering it cost-competitive.
Introduction
Increasing oil prices over the last two years prompted Saudi Arabia to call an emergency summit in June of 2008. Among concerns cited was a feeling that continued high oil prices would lead to increased uptake of alternative energy sources and a permanent demand shift. Our paper models such a situation -where a oil-owning oligopolist must consider the future production from a competitive fringe of alternative energy producers when determining the optimal supply from their finite resource. In our model, production costs and the competitiveness of the alternative are influenced not only by scarcity but by climate policy changes.
A common thread through many policies designed to combat global climate change is the premise that technological change in substitutes will be induced by higher traditional energy prices. The upshot of this is the implication that new technologies will play a key role in eventual emissions reductions and lower the total abatement costs and/or decrease the optimal quantity of emissions. In this paper, we argue that induced technological change may not be a magic bullet for climate change mitigation. In fact, we show that when previous results on strategic resource extraction are revisited, strategic incentives to maintain market share may lead to higher extraction of the resource relative to a case with no substitute, and that these effects may significantly detract from the effectiveness of climate change policy; in fact, we show cases where emissions may increase after the introduction of fiscal emissions control policies.
The notion of strategic action on the part of oil owners to avoid competition is not restricted to tales of the oil companies colluding to ensure the demise of the electric car. Poachers are assumed to be less efficient, but still induce a quantity response from the resource owner. Polasky (1994,2002) examine the impact of future competition on the management of a common property resource. Here, the actions of a monopolist under the threat of entry may lead to extinction of the harvested resource, while competi-1 see "Who killed the electric car?", Sony Pictures, 2006. tion from the outset would not. Harris and Vickers (1995) examine a related problem for non-renewable resources. In their case, a resource owner must take into account that the likelihood of their consumers developing an alternative source of energy due to increases in the price of their product. Similarly, in Cairns and Long (1991) , excessive rent-seeking by resource owners leads to diminished future rents as a result of regulation. These problems are related to earlier work by Dasgupta, Gilbert and Stiglitz (1982) since in each case, the traditional Hotelling rule is modified to characterize optimal resource management when the timing of a future substitute is endogenous.
In our paper, we explore the importance of strategic extraction responses in an environment where a resource owner faces a threat of competition from a substitute which is an experience good. The substitute may initially be significantly higher in cost, but potential learning-by-doing implies that this cost disadvantage is affected by the actions of the resource owner. The extraction of rents from the resource stock through conservation may be discouraged since higher energy prices encourage production by the emerging substitute. In equilibrium, dynamic incentives resulting from potential future competition may lead to either increased exploitation of the resource or over-use of the alternative technology for long-term gain. Depending on the relative costs and learning potentials, an equilibrium with learning may result in resources being extracted earlier and, in such a case, the potential endogenous technological change may exacerbate the climate change problem.
The results shown in our paper, like those in the papers listed above, suggest that the pricing of resources by their owners will not be independent of available substitute technologies, current and future climate policies, or potential future cost reductions in substitutes. However, literature on climate change policy has largely ignored these links. In papers such as Nordhaus (2002) and Popp (2004 Popp ( , 2006 ) which explore the potential for endogenous technological change to reduce abatement costs for climate change mitigation, resource prices are treated as a fixed function of cumulative extraction in both policy and no-policy scenarios, and are invariant to the state of the emerging alternative energy technology. We provide strong evidence that the resource pricing function which would be applied by a resource owner is strongly negatively related to the quality of any available substitute.
Our paper is unique in that it combines environmental policy, induced technological change through learning-by-doing, and strategic finite resource extraction. We use this structure to show that, contrary to the traditional wisdom, the potential for significant endogenous technological change may significantly detract from the effects of fiscal climate change policy. A carbon carbon or alternative energy subsidy makes the emerging technology relatively more competitive and increases the long-term value of the alternative technology, which leads to greater alternative energy production. However, the carbon policy also leads to lower long term values of resources, an effect which is exacerbated by learning-by-doing, which means that the resource-owner may see fewer gains to conservation. Depending on which effect dominates, equilibrium energy prices and emissions may increase or decrease after the imposition of fiscal climate change policy.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we develop the general model of the economy.
We characterize the dynamic, competitive equilibrium implied by this model and describe the algorithm used to solve it in Section 3. In Section 4, we use numerical simulations to characterize the dynamic equilibrium with and without policy intervention to illustrate the role of strategic incentives. Section 6 concludes.
The Model
The model characterizes equilibrium energy supply and demand for economy which uses energy at decreasing returns to scale. Energy may be derived from two sources: fossil fuels or alternative energy. 2 Alternative energy is an experience good, and so both its total and marginal production costs decline with cumulative production. We treat energy sources as perfect substitutes and denote the quantity of energy supplied by q t , and fossil and alternative energy supplies by f t and a t , and let q t = f t + a t . 2 We opt for a model structure which is simplified relative to that proposed in most Integrated Assessment Models (IAM's). In particular, we do not allow for climate change damages arising from emissions. These simplifications are not crucial here since our purpose is not to provide predictions of the magnitude of climate change or to compute optimal climate change policy, but rather to provide meaningful comparative dynamics. As long as the private incentives to reduce pollution for the sake of preventing future climate change are negligible, then our assumptions will not have significant leverage on our results.
The industrial organization of the energy sector is that of an oligopoly with n pricesetting, resource extraction firms and a price-taking fringe exploiting an alternative energy technology. The oligopolists compete in quantity of production, and do not co-operate to deter entry. Entry deterrence may arise only in the case where it can be sustained in a Nash equilibrium. Below, we explore each sector of the model before describing and solving for the competitive equilibrium.
Energy Demand
Energy is paid its marginal revenue product in production. Denote the total revenue product of energy consumption by P (q), and the marginal revenue product of energy by 
Resource Extraction
An initial, known stock of fossil fuels, X 0 is owned and extracted by n ≥ 1 symmetric firms. Denote by X i,t the resource stock owned by an individual firm and denote that firm's extraction rate by f i,t , so that:
and
The resource stock is subject to extraction and delivery costs which are constant in both in the intensity of extraction in each period and cumulative extraction. Let these costs be given by marginal condition c X (f t ) = c X .
Alternative Energy Supply
An emissions-free substitute for fossil fuels exists for energy production. Further, this alternative energy source is an experience good, such that future costs of production are decreasing in current production levels. Let the marginal cost of production of alternative energy be increasing in production in any period (a), and decreasing in the level of accumulated experience (A). In particular, let c(A, a) = c 0 A −η + c s a, η > 0. By construction, c A (A, a) < 0, c AA (A, a) > 0. Experience thus always reduces both the marginal and total costs of production, but at decreasing returns to scale. A doubling of experience reduces the price-intercept of marginal costs by a factor of 1 − 2 −η , which reduces both the marginal and total costs of producing emissions-free energy.
Given that there exists a positive level of initial experience, A(0) = A 0 > 0, experience evolves according to a learning-by-doing law of motion as:
We do not allow for experience depreciation, so that all experience accumulated remains relevant for all future time periods. The addition of depreciation would be analogous to slower learning rates or a higher discount factor in that such an assumption would imply a lower future value of current alternative energy supply.
Equilibrium
A subgame perfect equilibrium of this economy is defined such that firms each choose supply to maximize the net present value of profits under perfect foresight, with the following assumptions. First, we assume that a single, representative alternative energy firm exists and acts as a price-taker. The firm does not internalize the effect of an increase in alternative energy supply today on current energy prices, however the firm does internalize the future value of present experience. We assume that n ≥ 1 resource-extraction firm(s) pay(s) the constant extraction cost and extract(s) resources from a finite stock which they own. Resource owners compete in quantities, and so the economic environment is a Cournot-Nash oligopoly with a competitive fringe.
The state space is the same for both firms; the profits of each firm will be affected by current resource stocks (X) and accumulated alternative energy production experience (A). In the characterization of the economy, we also introduce carbon taxes and alternative energy subsidies, denoted by τ c and τ a respectively. With minor modifications, the indirect profit functions of each firm represent contraction mappings over this state and policy space. 4 The simultaneous solution to the dynamic programs developed below constitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium of (or closed-loop solution to) the economy.
Optimal behaviour: Alternative Energy Supply Firm
The alternative energy supply firm acts as a price taker, and also takes fossil fuel supply at each state as given and maximizes net present value of profits from alternative energy supply. Letf (X, A) be the total supply of fossil fuels at any point in the state space. Let τ at represent a subsidy to alternative energy supply. The alternative energy firm solves the following dynamic program:
subject to:
where γ a denotes the shadow value for the non-negativity constraint on a. The first order condition for the optimal choice of a given state (X, A) is:
while the accompanying complimentary slackness condition is:
The future value derived from experience,
, will be critical in the results shown below. Intuitively, this term should be decreasing in resource stocks, decreasing in ac- 4 The model as written is not stationary in accumulated experience, A. In solving the dynamic program, we redefine the the model in terms of the cost-intercept-shift term, A −η , which will always be bounded from below by zero and from above by its initial value, A −η 0 .
7 cumulated experience, and increasing under both carbon taxes and alternative energy subsidies.
The solution to this dynamic program yields a policy function, a(X, A|f ) which describes optimal behaviour at each point in the state space, given the actions of the resource extraction firms.
Optimal Behaviour: Resource Extraction Firms
Each resource firm takes the extraction decisions of the other (n − 1) resource firms as given. Let f i represent the individual firm's decision variable and let (n − 1)f j represent the supply of the other (n − 1) resource owners (where n ≤ 1), and letā(X, A) represent the supply of alternative energy at a given point in the state space (the solution to the dynamic program described in Section 3.1). Let τ f represent an emissions tax. Each resource-extraction firm solves the following dynamic program:
In the equations above, v f and γ f denote the shadow values for the individual extraction constraint, X/n − f i ≥ 0,and the non-negativity constraint on f i respectively. Resource firms are symmetric, so in equilibrium
The solution to this problem admits the potential for entry deterrence of the alternative energy suppliers wherever the alternative energy supply function has a price-intercept
), alternative energy supply will be zero which will therefore prevent learning-by-doing. The likelihood that entry-deterrence will occur in a Nash equilibrium will be more likely as n grows, less likely as X decreases, and less likely with higher learning rates or higher initial experience. For larger n, the total net present value of rents is smaller for each firm, and each firm has less ability to influence 8 the market quantity and price. This reduces the strategic incentive to reduce extraction.
Larger resource stocks owned by each firm imply lower resource rents, and so lower overall energy prices, which may imply a price below the alternative energy cost intercept. With higher learning rates, the future value of resources is reduced as the ability to extract rents decreases as experience is accumulated in the alternative sector. Similarly, with a technology that is far from competitive, the future value is increased since the economy is more dependant on finite resources, or willing to pay more for them.
Numerical Solution and Simulation
The simultaneous solutions to the dynamic programs defined in (4) and (9) will allow us to define the subgame perfect equilibrium for the competitive economy. Due to the structure employed, there will be no closed-form solution, so we base our results on numerical approximations of the value functions. We specify a particular case, however the results should generalize to any where an equilibrium with alternative energy only cannot result in a price lower than the resource extraction cost. We solve the model using a value function iteration algorithm previously used in Leach (2007) , which characterizes the solution to each value function as the fixed point of a neural network approximation of firm's value (indirect profit) function over a finite set of grid points. 5 , 6 A complete description of the algorithm used in the present analysis is presented in Table A -1 in the Appendix.
Parameterization
The intent of the present study to provide informative comparative dynamics based on reasonable parameter values and functional forms. We use parameters and functional forms which are comparable to those used in Integrated Assessment Models of climate change in the economics literature.
We adopt a total output function of Ωq θ , with θ ∈ (0, 1) and Ω calibrated so that the marginal revenue product of energy is comparable to the first period of the Nordhaus and We assume that the lower bound of the cost of alternative energy is less than the extraction cost of fossil fuels, and that the slope of the marginal cost of alternative energy is such that
i.e. when the cost of alternative energy is at its lower bound, the equilibrium energy price will be above the extraction cost of fossil fuel resources. As such, there is not a credible threat that the alternative energy sector could supply the entire market in equilibrium while not pricing below marginal cost. As such, resource stocks will always be fully extracted in equilibrium. The complete set of parameters used in the model simulation is provided in Appendix 3.4.
Results and Discussion
Below, we characterize the equilibrium under three learning rates (0, 25, and 50%) using both simulations across time and projections of equilibrium outcomes including supply functions and marginal values onto state variable space. For the main results presented below, we assume a monopolist resource owner (n = 1), a condition we relax in the sensitivity analysis section. Where learning-by-doing may occur, the paths of extraction and alternative energy supply follow markedly different paths relative to the no-learning case. On the extraction side, we see that in the 25% learning case, extraction is initially marginally higher than in the no-learning case, while the 50% learning case shows a rapid decrease in extraction after the first period. Rather than describe these transitions in any greater detail, we can look at the underlying factors which determine them. It is important to keep in mind through the results which follow that these are subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes.
Learning and Emissions in the Strategic Equilibrium
Since this is a dynamic model of oligopoly, the future values of resource stocks,
, and the future value of cost reductions resulting from current alternative energy production,
, will be key factors in determining outcomes. While we do not model a Stackelberg game, and so learning is taken as given by the resource owner, learning in the alternative will affect future resource values. Similarly, while resource extraction is taken as given by the alternative supplier, the level of remaining resources will affect the willingness of the alternative energy provider to produce at a price below marginal cost. In the left hand panel of Figure 2 , we see the willingness of the alternative energy firm to produce at a price below marginal cost. In both the 50% and the 25% cases, we see the expected results that the willingness to produce at a price below marginal cost is decreasing because there are decreasing returns to new experience in terms of future cost reductions. The 50% learning rate is so fast that rents from greater experience are almost non-existent after the first few periods. In the right hand panel, we see again the results of Nordhaus et al. being replicated in the no-learning case. Resource rents rise at the rate of discount until the resources are exhausted. Since there is no learning, the opportunity cost of resources after this point is constant. In the learning cases, this is not true -resource rents peak and then decline over time after exhaustion. With learning, the dynamic problem of the resource owner is analogous to a model of resource extraction with a backstop and with decreasing (residual) demand for resources. 7 The opportunity cost of resources will always be positive, and will asymptotically approach the equilibrium energy price at the lower bound of alternative energy costs, C(∞, a * ). The equilibrium rents lead to interesting pricing profiles. The first important result of note here is that, the faster is learning, the lower is the energy price in all periods. Perhaps more importantly, we see energy prices declining or flat over much of the simulation path, as increasing alternative energy supply and relatively small resource rents combine.
Prices are also non-monotonic, decreasing for a time where the alternative technology is new and cost decreases rapidly, and then increasing later as much of the learning has been completed and resource scarcity becomes important. While outside the scope of this figure, energy prices would eventually decline again following the declining marginal cost of alternative energy.
results from empirical tests of the Hotelling model (summarized in Gaudet (2007)) as well as for understanding the policy implications of induced innovation. These initial results suggest that, in cases where learning-by-doing is possible, we should expect lower and possibly declining energy prices, rather than the traditional view in much of the climate change economics literature that increasing fossil energy prices, taken as given, will drive alternative energy production and endogenous technological change. To further build the intuition for the solution, we now examine the state-contingent reaction functions derived from the solution to the firms' problems. Figure 4 shows the extremely important role of both learning potential and current economic state in determining optimal extraction. The figure shows two projections of the resource firm's optimal extraction function which takes optimal alternative energy supply, shown below in Figure   5 , as given. The left hand panel shows the equilibrium extraction decisions as functions of the remaining resource stocks (with the intercept of alternative energy cost held fixed at $250/ton CE, or just over twice the resource extraction cost of $113/ton CE), while the right hand panel shows optimal extraction as a function of the alternative energy cost, with resource stocks held constant (at X=200 Gtons CE). In both cases, there is a complete inversion of the relationship between learning rate and state-contingent extraction over the domain of the figure. For resource stocks, if resources are abundant, extraction is highest under the lowest learning rates, while if resources are relatively scarce, higher potential for learning leads to higher extraction. Similarly with the cost of the alternative. If the alternative is relatively cheap, the highest extraction occurs with the highest learning potential, however this relationship is partially reversed if the technology is currently very expensive. In this case, extraction takes on an inverted u-shape in learning rates, with the highest extraction occurring for the 25% learning rate. Simply put, for the resource owners, the optimal strategy is to extract rents if learning is either fast or slow -in the former case, it is a "make hay while the sun shines" approach, since the alternative will soon be cheap and will take over a large portion of the market, while with no learning, the firm faces a standard resource extraction problem. In between these two, the firm stands to gain from over-extraction since this slows the learning process. Figure 5 shows the equilibrium supply decisions of the alternative energy firm under the same assumptions discussed above. The alternative energy supply function is much more intuitive. Ceteris paribus, the faster the learning rate or the lower the cost of the technology, or the lower are the remaining stocks of resources, the higher the supply.
Combined, the strategies above have effects on energy prices which are largely consistent with what we might expect. Higher learning rates, larger remaining resource stocks or less expensive alternative technologies mean lower energy prices, ceteris paribus. The fact that lower energy prices prevail with higher potentials for endogenous technological change is important however -it runs counter to the traditional logic that high energy prices will drive the availability of alternative energy sources.
Behind the effects on energy prices in this dynamic equilibrium are the shadow values attached to the marginal costs of production,
, determine the degree to which, for a given state of the world, the alternative energy firm is willing to produce at a price below marginal cost and the importance the resource-owner places on conservation. These are shown in Figure 6 . In the top row, we see the important effect of learning rates on resource rents. Where learning can occur quickly, the future value of resources is negligible except when resource stocks will soon be exhausted. The future value of resources is monotonically decreasing in the learning rate and in the current cost of the alternative technology. Rather than suggesting that higher fossil fuel prices will drive learning-by-doing in the alternative sector, these results suggest that the greater is the potential for learning-by-doing, the lower are fossil fuel prices. For very fast learning rates, these results have an additional important interpretation. The strategic equilibrium predicts that energy prices are essentially unaffected by the remaining resources until very close to exhaustion; a result seemingly inconsistent with a Hotelling model of finite resource extraction.
A key motivation for this work is an assumption made in previous papers such as Nordhaus (2002) and Popp (2004 Popp ( , 2006 that resource prices will follow a fixed rent/pricing No learning (0%) Learning (25%) Fast Learning (50%) Fig. 6 . Shadow values of resources and alternative energy production as a function of the state, for the same assumptions are the same as in Figure 4 . All y-axis units are in $/ton CE. function curve even in an environment with endogenous technological change. However, consideration of Figure 6 suggests that in such an environment, the impact of introducing learning-by-doing or other forms of endogenous technological change will be overstated by such an assumption. The resource opportunity costs for which owners must be compensated in our model are strongly negatively related to learning rates and to the cost of the alternative technology. 9 The resource opportunity cost function for the no-learning case is analogous to the resource pricing function used in DICE-99 and ENTICE, which defines the marginal opportunity cost of a unit of resource as the stock declines. Here, we see clearly that this opportunity cost is affected significantly by both the learning potential in the alternative sector and the cost of the alternative energy technology.
9 For readers more accustomed to an optimal control treatment of resources, the values for
can be interpreted as initial scarcity rents, which would then rise at the rate implied by the co-state conditions of the solution to the optimal control problem over time.
Policies in a strategic environment
Above, we have shown that firm behaviour in both resource and alternative sectors will be altered significantly by learning rates in the absence of policies. In particular, we have emphasized the fact that, rather than modeling endogenous technological change as occurring as a result of resource prices which increase over time, it is imperative to internalize the reality that optimal resource prices will be lower the greater is the potential for endogenous technological change. This may invoke a stronger role for policies which can induce resource price increases earlier in the time horizon. Below, we show that these same dynamic incentives may significantly alter the results of such policies.
When policies are introduced in our model, the present and future playing fields are altered for all firms. An emissions tax increases the marginal cost to the resource firm, and erodes its ability to earn rent from the resource. This is magnified in the presence of the substitute energy source. First, there is less to gain by maintaining market share since the available rents are lower. Second, the alternative technology is a relatively greater threat, which also decreases expected future rents. Finally, from the alternative energy firm's point of view, a carbon tax renders the technology it exploits more cost-competitive, and the future gains to learning-by-doing today are increased since it can gain more market share in a shorter time. A subsidy to alternative energy has many of the same effects, altering the competitive balance in favour of the emerging technology. Below, we demonstrate the consequences of $25/ton carbon taxes and equivalent alternative energy subsidies each imposed across all possible states of the world.
In Figure 7 , we see that there is very clearly a relationship between learning potential, economic state, and the effect of fiscal emissions control policies. In the left hand panel, we see that the emissions reductions (in percentage terms) induced by a carbon tax are negatively related to the cost of the substitute technology and positively correlated with learning potentials. The effect of an alternative energy substitute, shown in the right hand panel, is also negatively related to the cost of the alternative and, disturbingly, can be shown to increase emissions depending on the current state of the world. Below, we explore each of these policies in detail to understand the effects shown in Figure 7 . 
Carbon Taxes
When we set carbon taxes, we generally expect that three things will occur. First, we expect that energy prices will rise. Second, we expect that emissions will fall. Third, we expect that alternative energy supply will increase and, where possible, that this will drive increased experience accumulation and eventual cost reductions in the alternative sector. While these expectations are realized in most cases in our model, we show that learning rates and present states of alternative technologies have substantial influence on the effects of emissions taxes. Specifically, when we look at the first effect, tax incidence will be strongly influenced by learning rates. In Figure 8 , we see the effect on energy prices of a $25 per ton CE carbon tax. In most cases, the energy price increases significantly. However, we see that in the 25% learning scenario, we may see a decrease in energy prices follwing a carbon tax. This is a result of the fact that the tax in this environment is sufficient to alter the competitive balance in favour of the alternative technology, and we will see a significant increase in supply. This occurs, as we show in Figure 9 , through an increased willingness of the alternative energy firm to produce at a price below marginal cost.
Further, some of the tax is absorbed through decreased resource rents. These combined effects may lead to a decrease in energy prices. Interestingly, while we generally think of the causality as increased energy prices stemming from a carbon tax leading to higher alternative energy production, here we see increased alternative production leading to reduced energy prices as a result of a carbon tax. While we certainly grant that the exact magnitude of responses, including the sign of the tax incidence, would depend on the supply and demand elasticities of the economy imposing the tax, the qualitative conclusions are likely robust to any plausible parameterization. No learning (0%) Learning (25%) Fast Learning (50%) Fig. 9 . Effect of a carbon tax on the rents charged to finite resources and the willingness of the alternative energy firm to produce at a price below marginal cost.
Alternative Energy Subsidies
Alternative energy subsidies are often intended to provide a "foot-in-the-door" for new energy sources. In Figure 7 above, we showed that a perverse result is possible in which these policies enhance the threat posed by alternative technologies and lead to increased in emissions. There is more to this story, as shown in Figure 10 . We would generally expect that a subsidy to an alternative energy firm would lower the energy price, subject to the magnitudes of the relevant supply and demand elasticities. While the incidence of carbon taxes on energy prices varied from slight decreases to increases of about 1/3 of the tax charge, subsidies always lead to decreases in the energy price which may be greater than the value of the subsidy. With a 25% learning rate, two combined effects lead to the large observed changes in energy prices. First, the resource firm absorbs some of the subsidy by reducing resource rents and increasing extraction. Second, the alternative 21 energy firm greatly increases their willingness to produce at prices below marginal cost.
As a result, energy prices decrease by more than the offered subsidy while extraction and alternative energy supply both may increase. The subsidy to alternative energy supply when alternative energy is an experience good will erode the future value of resource stocks, and eliminate a key motive for conservation by the resource owner. Even if the technology is not cost-competitive, the subsidy is equivalent to an increasing threat to future rents, and so causes a change to the net present value of the stocks. The most striking result is that this effect is strongest the further removed from cost-competitiveness is the technology which we choose to subsidize. Since we generally would focus subsidies on technologies that are far from being economically viable without them, this result holds significant weight in terms of the reliability of such policies in terms of generating real emissions reductions.
Overall, we see that that it is important to consider the impact of emissions policy, learning, and competition on the resource firm's decision making with respect to extraction.
The traditional Hotelling rent curve is certainly not invariant to introduced emissions control policy or to the nature of the substitute advantaged by the policy. If we were to consider resource prices as fixed, we would certainly see a greater shift in the alternative energy supply being brought about by the subsidies, and more importantly we would not see the increase in extraction brought about by strategic considerations. It would seem that, while much has been made of the expectation of increasing resource prices which Hotelling's model predicted and their interaction with carbon emissions control policy, it is important to remember that these policies will effect the degree to which optimal resource rent extraction will imply increasing prices over time.
Sensitivity Analysis
The results reported above are likely to be affected by three key assumptions among many others. First, the assumption that a single firm owns extraction rights to all resources and can extract monopoly rents may overstate the role for strategic responses. Second, the assumption that all returns to learning-by-doing are captured by producing firm may over-state the willingness to produce below marginal cost. Finally, the assumption of perfect substitutability of emerging technologies for traditional energy sources may again No learning (0%) Learning (25%) Fast Learning (50%) Fig. 10 . Change in equilibrium energy prices after the imposition of a $25 per ton alternative energy subsidy as a function of the cost of the initial unit of alternative energy. Horizontal lines denote price changes of $0/ton and -$25 per ton, the latter corresponding to a complete incidence of the subsidy on the rents earned by the resource firm.
over-state the value of alternative energy production experience and the potential loss of extractive resource rents. The sensitivity of results to the first two of these is easily shown within the current model architecture, while the latter is beyond the scope of sensitivity analysis as it would necessitate a complete recalibration of the model. While results change in magnitude, the general message of the analysis is not significantly altered when these assumptions are relaxed.
Market Power in the Resource Sector
In order to emphasize the interaction between resource rents and alternative energy technology and learning potential, we opted for a strong assumption of monopoly resource ownership. We break this assumption by moving to a 5-firm oligopoly in the resource sector, with each firm owning an equal share of the resource. This assumption does have very important implications for the results of the paper, and the reasons why are important for understanding the results.
In the sections above, the resource firm would alter its rent extraction behaviour on the basis of the future value of the alternative energy cost function. As firms are added to the resource sector, there are fewer rents extracted in each period, and therefore we would expect the future value of resources to drop in absolute value. What we see is that there is a marked change in the shape of the opportunity cost function as well. With the competitive fringe as well as the other resource firms, and with the potential for learning, there are too many barriers to sustained rent extraction. This appears to be driving the results shown in Figure 11 which shows that resource rents are pushed down and are nearly flat until resources become very scarce. The kinks in the resource rents is a result of the fact that, when costs are high, increased competition in the resource sector leads to increased extraction and lower prices and so no alternative energy is produced.
The simulations in Figure 11 show two disturbing effects. Most importantly, they show a case where competition in the resource sector is such that entry of the substitute is deterred even where learning is possible. This entry deterrence is such that small decreases in extraction (by any of the firms) would lead to alternative energy supply being positive and thus learning which erodes future rents. As a result, in Nash equilibrium, it may not be optimal to charge significant rents on resources until they are very near exhaustion.
This has disturbing implications for world energy markets which may be characterized as oligopolistic with a competitive fringe. If, as evidence suggests, energy producers are aware of the costs of alternative technologies and the implications for residual future demand for fossil fuels, we should not necessarily expect to see the long-term run up in energy prices as we head toward exhaustion. While this is certainly a stylized model, it produces a subgame perfect extraction equilibrium in which both extraction and prices are effectively constant until only 2-3 periods before the stock is fully extracted. No learning (0%) Learning (25%) Fast Learning (50%) Fig. 11 . Simulations over time and projections of resource and alternative energy rents when n=5.
Myopic Behaviour in the Alternative Energy Sector
We have assumed that the alternative energy sector is a dynamic, price taking firm which can capture all of the value of future cost reductions generated by current alternative energy supply. For various reasons, this may not be realistic. For example, patent projection may be imperfect, or technology may be disseminated to other firms who gain from observation. The limiting case of these market failures would be a case where learning-by-doing is effectively a public good, and so the firm producing today would not internalize any of the future value from these cost reductions. In Figure 12 , we show the results of re-solving the model for such a case.
In the Figure, we see that both extraction and alternative energy supply decisions are affected by the change. As would be expected, the alternative energy supply is lower since we have eliminated a benefit from production which is positive in all states of the world.
Recall that since this is a projection of reactions at a particular state, and the static problem of the alternative energy firm does not take account of learning-by-doing, the myopic reaction functions are very similar in the 25% and 50% learning cases. However, we see that in both cases there are important effects on the resource firm's strategy. Where the technology is cost-competitive, it is now optimal to extract less to extract more rents, while in the case where the alternative is expensive, entry deterrence is easier with the myopic alternative energy firm, and so resources are extracted faster. This shows how patent protection for innovation can affect emissions where substitute technologies are currently not cost-competitive.
Conclusion
This paper examines the role of learning-by-doing and environmental regulation on the extraction decisions of a strategic nonrenewable resource owner. In general, policy design has tended to focus on the roles of carbon taxes and scarcity in increasing energy prices and on the role of higher prices in inducing technological change, be it through research and development or learning-by-doing. We show an important reverse role. In our model, the higher the quality of the substitute, or the faster is learning, the higher may be the no-policy rate of resource extraction, which implies lower energy prices. In such a context, carbon taxes can have an important role in accelerating development of alternative technologies, however they may not always lead to large energy price increases. The latter has important consequences for climate policy evaluation, which has concentrated on the economy-wide effects induced by higher energy prices following from carbon taxes. Further, we show that while carbon taxes are immune to negative consequences in terms of emissions increases, the same cannot be said of an alternative energy subsidy. Subsidies are found to increase emissions in states of the world where alternative energy sources do not currently represent a viable alternative to fossil fuels. We are able to show that, under a variety of conditions, extraction and price paths for finite resources do not match what has been traditionally viewed as a Hotelling path, and that with learning-by-doing in an alternative, optimal rent extraction may imply price paths which are increasing, decreasing, flat or all of the above. a This parameter value is set such that the reduction in marginal cost for a doubling of accumulated experience corresponds to the learning rate specified.
Approximate Numerical Solution
In order to solve the value functions, we use a technique described in Kolstad (1999, 2001 ) and Leach (2007) , which characterizes the fixed point of the value function using an iterative algorithm combined with a neural network approximation of the value function over a finite set of grid points.
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The neural network approximation is defined as follows. 10 Define by L = 8 the number of nodes in the hidden layer, and let n = 2 represent the number of state variables in the model, such that the state space is R n . Denote by x ∈ R n+1 a set of real-valued signals to the network, with the first element (x 0 = 1) being a bias signal (analogous to a constant), and the remaining elements being the state vector for a particular point in the state space. Let χ 1 be a (n + 1) × L matrix of inner weights, and let z(x, χ 1 be a (L + 1) × 1 vector, with the first element (z 0 = 1) being a bias signal. The additional elements (z 1 ..z L ) are the output values from the hidden layer of the network, z l = tanh(χ ′ 1l x) ∀l = 1..L, where χ 1l represents a column of χ 1 . The L + 1 elements of z(x, χ 1 ) are then aggregated using outer weights χ 2 , a (L + 1) × 1 vector. We can thus express the approximation as: , χ 1 ) ) .
(.1) Using Φ k (s i |χ k ) to denote the approximation to the value (revenue) function of firm k defined over R 3 , we use the following iterative algorithm to solve the simultaneous solution to the value functions in the competitive equilibrium.
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Denote the set of choices by {a j (s i )} N i=1 and {f j (s i )} N i=1 for alternative energy supply and resource extraction respectively, for iteration j. Given this notation, the solution algorithm is implemented as follows:
Numerical Approximation Algorithm
Algorithm Preliminaries: Choose a convergence criterion ǫ, number of neural network nodes L, and starting values for the weights χ 1,k and χ 2,k in Φ k (x|χ k ) for k = {a, f }. Define ranges for each of the state variables to be covered by a grid, and a number of points N to make up the grid. Draw N points from a 2-dimensional low-discrepancy sequence and transform these points to meet the desired bounds of the state space.
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We set ǫ = 10 −4 , L=12, and N=1000. We set state space bounds so that 0 ≤ X < 500 and 0 < A −ζ2 < .2.
Step 1 : Solve the maximization problems given in (4) and (9), taking other firm's 10 For a detailed discussion of neural networks, the interested reader is again referred to Hassoun (1995) . 11 The approximation at state space point s i is defined over R 3 -the 2-dimensional state space, plus a constant. We use the notation s i without the addition of the constant for simplicity. 12 We use a Halton sequence to draw a set of grid points which are uniformly distributed within the state space. For details on low-discrepancy sequences, see Judd (1998) .
